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Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] demonstrate that capital structure is irrelevant to 
the value of the firm in a perfect, frictionless world without taxes. The introduction of 
deductibility of interest payment introduces benefits to debt financing over equity financing in 
the form of a tax shield and the capital structure therefore becomes important for the value of 
the firm. But increasing debt is not “a free lunch”. Expected bankruptcy costs and agency 
costs increase, which reduces the value of the firm. The objective for the firm is then to find 
the optimal capital structure where the marginal benefits from debt are equal to the marginal 
costs. Given the sizeable tax rates facing many corporations in various countries, the role of 
taxes for the capital structure is potentially important. However, Stewart Myers [1984] in his 
presidential address to the American Finance Association states (p. 588), “I know of no study 
demonstrating that a firm’s tax status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy. I 
think the wait for such a study will be protracted”. Gordon and Lee [2001] state that (p. 1) 
“Surprisingly, economists have had great difficulty providing evidence that taxes in fact lead 
to higher debt-equity ratios”. Although there is increasing evidence that taxes do matter 
(Graham [1996a], [1996b]) for the capital structure, the primary source of the evidence is 
  1obtained using listed US firms from the Compustat tapes
1. In general, these firms are 
relatively large, listed on a stock exchange, financially sophisticated and have access to debt 
markets. What remains to be established is whether the impact of taxes has general 
applicability to other countries and smaller unlisted firms with different financing sources. 
The first aim of this paper is therefore to analyze the impact of corporate taxes on the capital 
structure of small unlisted firms financed by financial institutions. To secure a sample of 
companies that differ from the large US firms on Compustat, a sample of smaller unlisted 
Portuguese firms is obtained from the Central Bank of Portugal. The advantage of using 
Portuguese firms is that Portugal is one of the poorest countries in the OECD, and the 
economic and institutional development therefore differs from that of the US, providing an 
independent setting for testing the capital structure theories. 
 
Small firms and large listed firms differ with respect to agency and asymmetric 
information problems and this gives rise to different finance sources for small and large firms. 
Small non-listed firms are in general informationally opaque when compared with larger 
firms and have different governance structures. Smaller firms are often owner-managed and 
this reduces the agency problems between equity holders and managers but exacerbates other 
problems between shareholders and creditors such as risk shifting. Although the proportion of 
debt in the capital structure is the same for small firms as for all firms, (at least in the US at 
around 50%, Berger and Udell [2000,p. 1]) the source of debt differs. Large firms are often 
financed by commercial papers, syndicated banks loans or loans from several banks and 
public bond issues, whereas small firms are in general financed by non-traded debt such as 
bank loans and trade credit
2. 
 
                                                 
1 See Graham [2003] for an excellent survey of the implications of taxes on corporate finance in general and for 
the capital structure of corporations in particular. 
2 For a discussion of small firm financing in the USA see Berger and Udell [1998]. 
  2Listed firms are required to submit information to the stock exchange and the 
newspapers monitor these firms on regular basis, whereas non-listed firms are only required 
to produce a straightforward annual report once a year and rarely appear in the press. The 
exposure of listed firms reduces the information opacity of these firms compared to non-listed 
firms. Of course non-listed firms can provide similar levels of information to that required in, 
for example, 10 K forms, but the product is not credible since there is no organization like the 
SEC to impose penalties for “wrong” information. The availability of public information, 
together with credit ratings, makes it possible to finance these firms with various forms of 
traded debt. Being listed and providing information as well as obtaining credit ratings entails 
a large proportion of fixed costs and this financing form is therefore more attractive for large 
firms compared to small firms. Yet, financial institutions are particularly good at gathering 
information about firms for which they are the sole banker. Through the payment system 
financial institutions have proprietary information about a firm’s cash flow which is not 
available to financial markets. Thus financial institutions may have advantages over financial 
markets and rating agencies in solving the asymmetric information problem. However, these 
advantages are smaller for large firms because, as argued by Mester et al. [2004], large firms 
often have several banking relationships, which reduce the advantage that can be obtained 
from financial intermediary knowledge of the firm’s transactions accounts. Financial 
institutions charge a higher interest rate than financial markets from their customers as 
compensation for monitoring whereas financial markets charge a lower rate on loans but a 
high fixed cost for credit ratings, listing requirements etc. Due to asymmetric information, it 
is overall cheaper for small non-listed firms to borrow from banks than financial markets and 
for large firms to access financial markets
3.  
 
                                                 
3 See Faulkender and Petersen [2004] for a further discussion.  
  3Agency and governance problems associated with debt financing are also solved 
differently by financial institutions and financial markets. For a bond issue the contract is 
negotiated up front and it is very difficult to change the terms of the contract, including 
covenants, maturity date and amount of the loan or interest, once the bond is sold since all 
lenders have to agree. For firms with higher agency costs, financial markets will charge 
higher interest rates and reduce the size of the issue as well as demanding the inclusion of 
strict covenants in the debt contract. Thus the presence of agency problems in large listed 
firms increases interest rates, which reduces the amount of debt on the balance sheet and, to 
the extent that the amount of debt is restricted, firms may be prevented from pursuing the 
optimal amount of debt for the purpose of maximizing the value of the tax shield. Financial 
institutions, on the other hand, solve these problems by continuous monitoring. For instance 
they use the payment system and “continuous” re-negotiation of the debt contract. In 
particular, the bank manager has the ability to withhold new credit and to change the 
conditions of the loan as well as cancel old credit. The ability of the manager to do this is a 
credible threat and the incentive of managers/owners to exploit moral hazard problems is 
reduced. Thus under bank financing the amount of debt is not the primary tool to control 
agency problems. The bank uses monitoring and the threat of withdrawing future debt or 
increasing the price of future debt to control agency problems.  
 
Financial markets can also increase interest rates on future debt to reflect a new 
situation when debt is re-negotiated, but the original lenders in financial markets cannot 
recover their losses since the firm can sell new (and dearer) debt in a competitive market to 
new lenders, which just reflects the current conditions. The situation is different for financial 
institutions; they can charge a higher rate than is warranted, i.e. impose a penalty and recover 
the original losses, because it is costly for the firm to change its banker. Thus, a financial 
  4institution can more easily recover its losses. Financial markets therefore have to protect 
themselves ex-ante, whereas financial institutions have a credible threat that they can exercise 
ex-post. This scenario has two consequences for borrowers from financial institutions. First, 
both the borrower and the financial institution are interested in maximizing the value of the 
firm and with a credible threat in hand the financial institution is likely to allow the firm to 
exploit potential tax benefits of debt. Second, since the solution to the agency problem does 
not involve the actual amount of debt supplied by a financial institution, we are less likely to 
find a relationship between proxies (derived from the balance sheet) for agency problems and 
small firm capital structure. On the other hand, we are more likely to find a tax effect for 
small firms compared to large firms (as discussed above). Thus the factors determining the 
capital structure for non-listed firms financed by financial institutions and large listed firms 
may be different. 
 
In the trade-off model the optimal level of capital structure is determined by the 
factors influencing the marginal benefits (tax shield) and costs (expected bankruptcy costs and 
agency costs) of debt financing. Rajan and Zingales [1995], Wald [1999], Booth et al. [2001] 
and Aggarwal and Jamdee [2003] have, among others, studied these factors in an international 
setting and have found that the same set of factors determining the capital structure used in 
US studies also applies to large non-US listed firms. However, all of these papers use listed 
firms which are also the largest firms in their respective countries; Rajan and Zingales [1995] 
and Aggarwal and Jamdee [2003] look at the G7 countries, Wald [1999] at the G5 countries 
and Booth et al. [2001] at 10 developing countries. To some extent it is not surprising that the 
same factors explain the capital structure in the largest listed firms in various countries. These 
large firms are often important players in international trade and therefore have to adjust their 
balance sheet to international standards. Moreover, due to their large size and scope of 
  5operations, they are often partly financed by international financial markets and institutions 
which impose a common structure on the balance sheet. It is therefore not clear whether the 
use of large firms across different countries constitutes an independent test of the factors 
determining the capital structure. Smaller firms, on the other hand, tend to operate locally and 
are financed by local financial institutions and these firms are therefore less likely to be 
influenced by international standards. Thus a sample of these firms provides a potentially 
stronger test of the robustness of the factors determining capital structure, including the 
impact of taxation, than the use of large listed firms. A secondary aim of this paper is 
therefore to test whether the factors relevant to large listed firms are also relevant to smaller 
non-listed firms. For this purpose we use data from Portugal, a smaller OECD country. The 
advantage of using this data is that Portugal is one of the least developed countries in the 
OECD and so its banks and financial markets are less likely to mimic those of the large and 
more developed countries (G7), thereby providing a quite different institutional setting to that 
existing in the G7 countries.  
 
  Portugal is a bank-oriented country with a small stock exchange and a universal bank 
system. The banking system which was completely privatized at the end of 1985, comprises 
the central bank and 90 commercial banks (62 domestic and 28 foreign including Madeira’s 
off-shore banks). The banking system is strongly concentrated in five financial groups having 
more than 75% of all bank assets. Banks have established subsidiaries for leasing, insurance, 
factoring, underwriting, corporate services, etc. In 1999 domestic banks accounted for 93% of 
total bank assets. Thus the influence of foreign banks is very small. Compared to market-
based economies like US, UK and Canada, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(which is a good approximation of the equity market importance) is 51.75% in Portugal 
  6whereas it is 180, 203 and 126%, respectively for US, UK and Canada
4. Domestic bank credit 
to the private sector as a fraction of GDP is in line with the above countries, with 121% 
comparable with 145, 123 and 83%, respectively. Thus the financial system and the financing 
of firms differ significantly from those of the US. 
 
  A target adjustment model representing the traditional trade-off of capital structure is 
estimated for a sample of 998 non-listed Portuguese firms for the period 1990 to 2000 (7,765 
firm-year observations). The two main results of the paper are as follows. First, there are 
significant tax effects on capital structure. Second, the traditional variables used for modeling 
agency costs and asymmetric information in large listed firms by, e.g. Rajan and Zingales 
[1995] for the G7 countries, do not work well for smaller non-listed firms. The main 
determining factor, besides taxes, for the level of debt in small firms is the availability of 
collateral. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the target adjustment 
model used to test for tax effects is discussed. In section 3 data and variables used in the 
empirical analysis are discussed. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4 and section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Target adjustment model 
  The basic model used to test for a tax effect is a static trade-off model in the form of a 
target adjustment model. As discussed in the introduction, debt has benefits in terms of a tax 
shield, but as debt increases, so do the expected bankruptcy and agency costs between 
shareholders and debtholders
5. The optimal or target capital structure is determined by the 
                                                 
4 Merrill Lynch: “Size & Structure of the World Bond Market: 2002”, International Financial Statistics and 
World Bank Group: “World Development Indicators Database”. 
 
5 The agency costs between shareholders and management may decrease as a consequence of the increase in 
debt. However, in this paper we focus on small and medium size firms where this conflict is reduced since the 
shareholders often operate the firm. 
  7equality of marginal benefits with marginal costs. Due to various transactions costs Taggart 
[1977] and Jalilvand and Harris [1984] suggest that managers adjust the current capital 
structure towards the optimal structure over time. Thus changes in the current debt ratio, 
defined as debt over total assets, are given by a partial adjustment to the deviations of the 
current ratio from the target: 
( )
*
,1 it it i t it DD D γ − ∆= − + e       (1) 
where ∆Dit is the first difference of debt level for firm i at time t, γ the target adjustment 
coefficient with 0 < γ < 1 indicating positive adjustment costs, D
*
i t is the target debt level for 
firm i at time t and eit represents random shocks to the current capital structure. A value of γ 
close to one indicates a rapid adjustment of the current capital structure towards the target or 
optimal capital structure. 
 
  The target or optimal capital structure is determined by the marginal benefits and costs 
of debt financing. Few of these benefits and costs can be measured directly and it is therefore 
necessary to use a set of proxies, such as corporate marginal tax rate, collateral value of 
assets, size and profitability. The (unobserved) target level for firm i at time t is given by: 
D*it = α +βTAX TAXi t + βZ Zit    (2) 
where D
*
it is the (unobserved) target debt level for firm i at time t, α is the intercept term, 
TAXit is the tax variable and Z is a vector of variables some of which are identified by Rajan 
and Zingales [1995] (size, profitability, bankruptcy risk, etc.). Substituting equation (2) into 
(1) yields: 
∆ Dit = γ (α +βTAX TAXi t + βZ Zit – Di t – 1) + ei t    Ù 
Dit = γ α + γ βTAX TAX + γ βZ Zit + (1 – γ) Di t – 1 + eit (3) 
 
  8  Equation (3) can be estimated as a “linear model”. The parameters, γβ, are estimated 
jointly but the value of β can be retrieved by dividing by one minus the parameter estimate in 
front of the lagged dependent variable.  
 
3. The data sample 
  The primary data source is the Bank of Portugal Statistical Department’s database. 
This database contains balance sheet and income statement data for 3,083 non-listed firms 
with 17,737 non-continuous firm-year observations. Several selection criteria were imposed 
for inclusion in the sample. Only manufacturing firms with more than 100 employees in all 
the years (in the period 1990-2000) are included. Firms with negative net worth, negative 
taxes, equity less than 2,000 euros (minimum amount allowed by law) and less than four 
continuous data years (required for estimation purposes) are not included in the sample. The 
final sample consists of 998 firms and 7,765 firm-year observations. On average the number 
of continuous observations for a firm is between 7 and 8 years. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 1 here] 
 
  Table 1 shows the number of observations by year and industry. The lowest number of 
firms appears in 1990 and year 2000 with 523 and 597 observations respectively. Industry 
class 2, textiles and clothing, has the most observations over the sample period and the 
smallest industry is class 5, heavy industry.  
 
  To reduce survival bias, firms are allowed to leave and enter the data set over time. 
More than one third of the firms in the sample have 10 years or more of continuous data. 25% 
  9of the sample has between 7 and 9 years of continuous data and 38% of the sample has 
between four and six years of continuous data. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 2 here] 
 
  Table 2 reports the average common-size balance scaled by total assets for a number 
of years between 1990 and 2000. The amount of tangible assets as a percentage of total assets 
is between 34% (2000) and 43% (1990). Of the G7 countries in 1991 and 2003 (in brackets) 
Canada had the highest percentage of tangible assets, namely 51.6% (46.2%), the UK 41.3% 
(31.6%) and France the lowest with 24.4% (19.1%) (as reported by Rajan and Zingales [1995] 
and Aggarwal and Jamdee [2003]). Canada is out of line with the other G7 countries primarily 
due to the influence of the oil and exploration industry which is dominated by firms with high 
levels of fixed assets. Thus it appears that the percentage of tangible assets is slightly higher 
in Portugal compared to the G7 countries, but the trend of falling fixed assets as a percentage 
of the total assets is the same as for the G7 countries. The percentage of intangible assets is 
between 1% and 4% over the period, whereas for the G7 countries it ranges from 0.8% (1.7%) 
in Japan to 8.5% (16.9%) in France. Since fixed assets are used as collateral for debt, it 
appears that Portugal has the opportunity for slightly higher debt levels compared to the G7 
countries and we would expect the amount of debt to fall over the sample period due to the 
fall in tangible assets during the nineties. The other assets, such as inventories and debtors are 
equivalent to those in the G7 countries, but cash and cash equivalents are significantly lower 
in Portugal at between 2% and 6% whereas for the G7 countries they are between 8.2% 
(10.1%) for Canada and 18.4% (15.2%) for Japan. Thus Portuguese firms have fewer reserves 
compared to G7 countries available for meeting interest payments and for replacing short-
term debt in case of liquidity squeeze. Financing through financial institutions is often 
  10undertaken through a credit line and as long as this line is not fully utilized, there is less 
demand for holding cash compared to firms without credit lines or with relatively smaller 
credit lines. Since small firms rely more on financial institutions and credit lines, they are also 
likely to have less demand for holding cash compared to larger firms. On the other hand large 
firms are more diversified and therefore have a smaller demand for precautionary balances.  
 
On the liability side of the balance sheet Portuguese firms have significantly more 
equity; nearly 50% of the balance on average is equity, whereas for the G7 countries it is from 
28% (Germany) to 42% (UK) for 1991. For the year 2001 the figures have changed for the G7 
countries where France now has 11.9% in equity and the UK 47%. The amount of current 
liabilities in Portugal ranges from 33% to 40%, whereas for the G7 countries it ranges from 
23% (23.1%) for Canada to 43.2% (37.6%) for Italy and 43%.4 (66%) for France. Thus 
Portugal has slightly more current liabilities than the average G7 country (treating France as 
an outlier) which reflects the higher use of trade credits in Portugal. The main difference is in 
terms of long-term debt where the Portuguese firms only have between 13% and 16%, 
compared with the G7 countries’ range of 18% (18%) for the UK to 42% (26.2%) for 
Germany. The Portuguese firms also use more equity finance compared with the G7 
countries, whereas long-term debt is more prevalent in the G7 countries. This is consistent 
with the view that large firms use financial markets to raise long-term debt, whereas smaller 
firms rely more on trade credit and bank debt. However if the comparison is made with the 
distribution of equity and debt presented in Berger and Udell [1998], the results are quite 
s i m i l a r .  T h e i r  U S  s a m p l e  o f  S M E s  s h o w e d  that small businesses depend on both equity 
(49.6%) and debt (50.4%). These values are quite close to the Portuguese sample. In fact in 
Portugal total equity varies between 46% and 49% and debt between 51% and 54%. For trade 
credit and bank financing the values are very similar as well. In Berger and Udell [1998] 
  11financial institutions and trade credit represent 18.8% and 15.8% respectively, whereas in 
Portugal values range from 16% to 23% (bank loans) and 10% to 14% (trade credit). Using a 
sample of 10,000 UK SMEs Poutziouris et al. [2005] also document that trade credit is an 
important part of small firm financing, amounting to 11% of total assets. Although the 
Portuguese financial system differs from the US financial system, the financing of smaller 
firms seems to be similar, whereas there are significant differences between the financing of 
large listed and smaller non-listed firms. Thus it appears that being large and listed is a 
significant factor for determining the capital structure and it is therefore not clear whether 
results derived from a sample of these firms carry over to smaller non-listed firms. 
 
3.1 Measuring debt 
The three main financing sources for Portuguese firms are bank loans, trade credit and 
internally generated equity. In general, we view trade credit as part of working capital and the 
focus of the paper is therefore on bank loans. Data is available for both long-term and short-
term liabilities
6 and three different ways of measuring debt (dependent variables) are 
constructed: 
a)  TOTALLOANS equal long-term bank loans plus short-term bank loans plus creditors 
minus debtors plus other current liabilities over the book value of total assets; 
b)  LONGBANKLOANS equal the book value of total long-term bank loans over book 
value of total assets; 
c)  SHORTBANKLOANS equal the book value of total short-term bank loans over book 
value of total assets. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
6 Long-term debt is defined as debt with a maturity longer than one year and short-term debt has a maturity of 
less than one year. 
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  Table 3 reports the percentage of firm-year observations with positive bank loans. It is 
shown that 54.26% percent of firm-year observations report long-term bank loans, 76.32% 
have short-term bank loans and 81.88% report short- and/or long-term bank loans. The 
distinction between short-term and long-term bank loans is not clear since firms often have 
“current accounts” with an open authorized amount provided by the bank. These are per 
definition short-term loans, but are rolled over and can therefore be interpreted and reported 
as long-term loans. Indeed, the number of firms that report non-zero levels of long-term bank 
loans plus short-term bank loans is similar to previous studies (Graham et al. [1998]). 
Dividing the sample into 5 size groups based on the number of employees (not reported 
separately) shows that the percentage of firm-year observations with strictly positive levels of 
debt is higher for large firms than for small firms. Around 83% of large firms have some kind 
of debt with 58% reporting long-term bank loans and 80% reporting short-term bank loans. 
For small firms, 80% report the use of debt but only 49% report long-term bank loans. This is 
in spite of the fact that the percentage of some kind of debt is quite similar across both small 
and large firms. Large firms use long-term debt more often and so there is a distinct 
difference in the use of bank debt between small and large firms. A relatively large number of 
small firms rely solely on short-term debt (32%) and fewer small firms in general report the 
use of long-term debt only (7%). 
 
3.2 Tax variables 
  In order to test for tax effects, a measure for the corporate marginal tax rate is 
required. Here the three measures developed by Graham [1998,2000] are utilized
7:  
                                                 
7 In the existing literature other proxies have also been used: statutory tax rates, non-debt tax shields, tax loss 
carry-forwards and dummy variables (Bradley et al. [1984], Titman and Wessels [1988], Bartholdy et al. [1989], 
Mackie-Mason [1990] and Scholes et al. [1990]). The results from these variables are consistent with the 
analysis presented in the paper and the results for these variables are available upon request. 
  13a)  MTREBIT: Before-financing marginal tax rate, a simulated marginal tax rate based 
on income after depreciation but before interest expenses are deducted;  
b)  KINK: Adapted from Graham [2000] and calculated as earnings before interest and 
taxes over interest
8; 
c)  STAND: Standardized Kink is defined as kink time interest over the standard 
deviation of earnings before interest. 
 
3.2.1. MTREBIT - before-financing marginal tax rate 
  The marginal tax rate is defined as the present value of current and expected future 
taxes paid on an additional unit of income earned today. The methodology used here follows 
Graham ([1998], [2000]) for calculating firm specific marginal tax rates and involves three 
sets of inputs: the current tax rules, in particular how losses are treated, the statutory tax rate 
and expected future earnings
9.  
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 1 here] 
 
  Figure 1 shows the distribution of the before-financing marginal tax rate for 5,828 
firm-year observations.
10 For about 89% of the observations (firm-year) of MTREBIT, the 
income before interest and taxes is positive and the before-financing marginal tax rate is 
therefore equal to the statutory tax rate. The remaining 11% have negative earnings before 
interest and taxes and from this group 22% have a marginal tax rate of zero (could not offset 
the losses against the profits in the five or six following years). The years 1993 and 1996 are 
the ones where the percentage of marginal tax rate of zero is higher when compared with the 
number of observations with negative earnings before interest and taxes (around 28%), while 
                                                 
8 An alternative measure based on bank interest paid was also used with similar results. 
9 For details of the calculations see appendix. 
10 Years 1990, 1991 and 1992 are excluded due the marginal tax rate calculation. 
  141998 is the one with the lowest value (14%). The remaining 78% of the firms have a marginal 
tax rate ranging between zero and the statutory tax rate. The annual average marginal tax rates 
from 1993-2000 are: 33.7%, 34.2%, 34.08%, 33.88%, 32.48%, 32.3%, 32.00% and 29.2%, 
respectively. Part of this variation is generated by the change in the statutory tax rate over the 
years. To the extent that the earnings forecasts are biased upwards as suggested in the 
Appendix and Table A1, these numbers may be biased upwards as well. 
 
  One way to avoid the endogeneity problem between tax rates and debt policy is to 
measure tax rates before the financing decision is taken, as in Graham [1998] the marginal tax 
rate is based on income before interest is deducted. However, as argue in Graham [2003], this 
approach does not completely solve the problem and therefore the lagged value of the before- 
financing marginal tax rate is used as well. 
 
  A higher marginal tax rate implies that an increase in debt will decrease taxes more for 
a firm with high marginal tax rates than for firms with low marginal tax rates. Thus the 
marginal tax should have a positive correlation with the level of debt.  
 
3.2.2. Kink 
  This variable is adapted from Graham [2000] and measures whether firms use debt 
conservatively or aggressively, i.e. if firms use debt to minimize taxes. An aggressive firm 
with positive earnings before interest and taxes would issue just enough debt to ensure that 
earnings after interest but before tax are zero, whereas a conservative firm would issue less 
debt and therefore face positive taxes. Firms with positive earnings after interest payments 
could increase their level of debt and interest payments and achieve a marginal tax benefit 
which is equal to the statutory tax rate. For firms with negative earnings after interest 
  15payments, the marginal benefits of increasing debt are smaller than the statutory tax rate. To 
measure these effects, a variable labeled kink is defined as the ratio between earnings before 
interest and taxes (equal to the amount of interest payments required to make earnings equal 
to zero) and actual interest paid. If kink is less than one, then earnings before tax are less than 
the actual interest paid and earnings after interest are therefore negative. This represents an 
aggressive debt policy, whereas if kink is above one then earnings after interest are positive 
and the firm uses debt more conservatively. Thus conservatism and kink are positively 
related, and kink is negatively related with debt levels. Also kink is positively correlated with 
the marginal tax rate. Figure 2 shows the relation between the marginal tax benefit of debt and 
the kink variable. 
 
[PLEASE insert Figure 2 here] 
 
3.2.3. Standardized kink 
  As referred by Graham [2000] firms with large values of kink use debt conservatively. 
However, the degree of conservatism is also a function of the degree of volatility of the 
earnings. If two firms have the same value of the kink variable but one has more volatile 
earnings than the other, then the firm with more volatile earnings has a less conservative 
policy since the probability of being on the downward sloping part of the benefit function 
(aggressive debt policy) in the future is higher for this firm than for the firm with lower 
volatility. To capture this, a standardized kink variable is constructed as interest multiplied by 
Kink divided by standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes. This is a measure of 
the flat part of the benefit curve in Figure 2 per unit of earnings volatility. If the probability of 
the firm staying in the “flat” part is lower (low standardized kink values), then there is less 
  16advantage to using debt as a tax shield. Thus a positive relation between this variable and debt 
levels is expected.  
[PLEASE insert Table 4 here] 
 
  Table 4 shows a summary of the tax variables and their expected relationship with 
debt levels. 
 
3.3 Agency, asymmetric information and bankruptcy variables 
  The secondary purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the factors identified by 
Rajan and Zingales [1995] (as well as other factors) as being relevant for large firm capital 
structure in the G7 countries are also relevant to the capital structure decision of smaller non-
listed firms. The theories (agency theory, asymmetric information and bankruptcy) and 
previous empirical work on capital structure suggest that collateral value of assets, 
profitability and size, volatility of earnings, growth, bankruptcy probability, nominal interest 
rates, inflation rate, interest rates spread, unemployment rate, years of incorporation and 
financial distress (among others) may have an influence on the capital structure. 
 
A firm with a high percentage of tangible assets in relation to total assets can support a 
higher debt level because these assets can be used as collateral for loans and thus reduce the 
expected bankruptcy costs. On the other hand a high percentage of fixed assets also implies 
higher operating leverage which increases the probability of bankruptcy, suggesting a 
negative relation between fixed assets and debt. Thus under the bankruptcy theory, the 
parameter can be either positive or negative. High levels of fixed assets reduce agency costs 
associated with increases in risk and risk shifting. Finally, the problem of underinvestment 
(Myers [1977]) is reduced if a large proportion of the firm’s assets is fixed. Thus agency 
  17theory suggests a positive correlation between debt and fixed assets. Rajan and Zingales 
[1995] found that this factor is positive and significant for all the G7 countries except Italy.  
 
  Profitable firms in general generate more cash than less profitable firms. For a given 
debt level profitable firms therefore have a smaller probability of default and expected 
bankruptcy cost. As Jensen [1986] argued, the generation of cash may entice managers to 
build empires and undertake projects with negative NPV. Increasing the level of debt for 
profitable firms serves as a bonding mechanism to reduce the possibilities for managers to 
waste funds on negative NPV projects. These two arguments suggest a positive relation 
between debt and profitability. However, Myers and Majluf [1984] argue that informational 
asymmetries cause firms to prefer internally generated funds over debt, referred to as the 
pecking order theory. Since profitable firms generate more cash than less profitable firms, 
they are expected to have less debt under the pecking order theory. Titman and Wessels 
[1988] find a negative relation between profitability and leverage, whereas Rajan and 
Zingales [1995] find mixed evidence: a negative and significant effect for USA, Japan and 
Canada, yet insignificant effect for France, UK and Italy and a positive yet insignificant effect 
for Germany. Given that this sample consists of primarily bank-financed firms where banks 
are capable of solving the ex-ante asymmetric information problem through continuous 
monitoring and renegotiation of debt contracts, it is expected that asymmetric information is 
not a major problem when the firm wants to add additional debt from the same bank to its 
balance sheet. We therefore expect a positive relation between profitability and leverage.   
This variable is defined in the same way as in Titman and Wessels [1988] and Rajan and 
Zingales [1995] i.e. as earnings before interest and taxes divided by book value of assets. An 
alternative measure defined as return on assets (ROA) calculated as earnings after taxes and 
interest over total assets is also utilized. 
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In general intangible assets have poor value as collateral for loans, which leads to a 
negative correlation between debt and the amount of intangible assets. Intangible assets may 
also be a measure of asymmetric information, since these assets are very opaque to external 
creditors, and thus are negatively correlated with debt. Finally, these assets may represent 
future growth opportunities or real options and, in line with Myers [1977], the increased debt 
may lead to underinvestment. Thus a negative correlation is expected. 
 
  Given that there are fixed costs associated with bankruptcy and large firms in general 
have lower probability of bankruptcy compared to small firms, it is expected that large firms 
have more debt in their capital structure than smaller firms. Rajan and Zingales [1995] found 
a significant positive effect for the size variable for USA, Japan, UK and Canada, a positive 
insignificant effect for France and Italy and a negative significant effect for Germany. This 
variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Another 
interpretation is that larger firms have more diluted ownership and less control over their 
managers and so the board uses increased debt to control management. 
 
  As an increase in business risk raises the probability of bankruptcy, it is expected that 
the level of business risk is negatively correlated with the amount of debt. The standard 
deviation of return on assets is used as a business risk proxy. 
 
  A fast-growing firm is often seen by the banking sector as a healthy firm with smaller 
probability of bankruptcy and growth is therefore expected to be positively correlated with 
debt levels. An alternative interpretation is that high-growth firms have more real options for 
future investments than low-growth firms. If high growth firms decide to issue debt then this 
  19may, as discussed by Myers [1977], lead to underinvestment. Also the potential for risk 
shifting and other agency problems between shareholders and creditors increases with high 
growth. Thus agency theory suggests a negative relationship between debt and growth. To the 
extent that there is more asymmetric information for high-growth firms, asymmetric 
information theory also predicts a negative relationship. This variable is defined as the 
percentage change in total assets. 
 
  If bankruptcy is costly, then the amount of debt should be a decreasing function of the 
probability of bankruptcy. A modified version of Altman’s [1968] discriminant function 
predictor of bankruptcies is used in this paper. A negative correlation is expected between the 
modified version of Altman’s Z-Score and debt levels. This variable is defined as: 
 
Assets   Total
Capital   Working
  1,2    
Assets Total
Earnings   Retained
  1,4  
Assets   Total
Sales
  1,0    
Assets   Total
EBIT
  3,3 + + +  
 
  An increase in nominal interest rates raises the cost of borrowing and it is expected 
that the firms will borrow less. Since nominal rates are closely related to inflation rates, these 
two variables may capture the same effects and therefore only one of the two should be used 
in analysis. 
 
  The difference between short- and long-term interest rates can be either positively or 
negatively related to debt levels. It is calculated as the difference between short-term and 
long-term interest rates (given by the three-month risk-free rate and ten-year Treasury bond 
rate respectively). A decrease in the spread makes long-term financing relatively more 
expensive and so it is expected that firms will make more use of short-term finance and roll it 
  20over as required. Thus it is expected that the spread variable is positively related to long-term 
debt and negatively related to short-term debt. 
 
  The age of the firm can be used as proxy for the amount of available information about 
the firm. For young firms there is very little information available. In general it is difficult to 
obtain bank loans of any kind if the firm does not have a financial history and a positive 
relation between this variable and debt levels is expected. This variable is calculated as in 
Giannetti [2003] as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the date of 
incorporation of the firm.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 summarizes the expected impact on capital structure of the agency, 
asymmetric information and bankruptcy variables. The expected theoretical relation to debt 
levels and references to authors who have used these variables in previous research are 
shown. As seen from the table it is difficult to distinguish clearly between the three theories 
based on the above variables, but the variables for bankruptcy risk can be used to test the 
bankruptcy theory and the growth variable can be used to distinguish between bankruptcy 
theory and agency theory. Finally the age variable can be used to test the agency and 
asymmetric information theories and the probability variable to distinguish between 





  213.4 Descriptive statistics 
[PLEASE insert Table 6 here] 
 
  Panel A of Table 6 reports summary statistics for the levels of the different debt 
measures. On average, long-term bank loans account for 7.04% of total assets, short-term 
bank loans for 10.23% and both short- and long-term bank loans for 17.27%. If firm-year 
observations with no debt are excluded, then the average long-term bank loans account for 
12.85% of total assets, short-term bank loans for 13.38% and short- and long-term bank loans 
for 20.99%. 
 
  In Panel B the summary statistics for the tax variables are presented. The value of the 
lagged before-financing marginal tax rate (MTREBIT) is 33.83% with a maximum value of 
36% (maximum value for the statutory tax rate) and a standard deviation of 0.0618%. The 
mean value of Kink indicates that the average firm could increase total interest deductions 
2.32 times before the marginal benefit begins to decline. The average firm has a standardized 
kink of 1.56. Firms with standardized kink values between 1.5 and 7.0 have benefit functions 
which are more than two standard deviations in length
11 (table not reported). This means that 
firms with high kink values can stay in the flat part of their benefit function in most of the 
scenarios and therefore use the full benefits of debt.  
 
  Panel C provides the sample statistics for the agency, asymmetric information and 
bankruptcy variables. The average intangible and tangible assets are 1.13 and 39.18% of total 
assets. Earnings before interest and taxes are 34.90% of the total assets on average. Firms 
have an average growth measured as the percentage change in total assets of 10.81%. The 
                                                 
11 These results are in line with Graham [2000]. 
  22measure of financial distress, Z-Score, averages about 1.58 for all firm-year observations, but 
there is a large dispersion around this number (standard deviation of 0.97). The 
macroeconomics variables, short-term interest rate, interest rate spread, inflation and 
unemployment rate, are on average 8.48, -0.29, 5.40 and 6.22 percent, respectively. 
Regarding the number of years from the incorporation of the firm, the average value is 22 
years with a standard deviation of 2.3 years and a maximum of 243 years.  
 
[PLEASE insert Table 7 here] 
 
  Table 7 reports the correlation matrix for the tax and agency, asymmetric information 
and bankruptcy variables. The lagged before-financing marginal tax rate is positively 
correlated with all the other tax variables with a correlation coefficient around 0.16. The 
relatively low correlation coefficients indicate that the variables may be catching different 
aspects of the tax effect or are at best noisy proxies for the underlying tax effect. If the proxies 
are noisy, then it may be difficult to find tax effects but, worse, these proxies may capture 
other effects that have nothing to do with tax effects. From the correlation matrix it appears 
that multicollinearity is (probably) not a problem in this sample. The correlation matrix also 
shows that there is a positive correlation between MTREBIT and PROFITABILITY (more 
profitable firms pay more taxes) and also that there is a negative correlation between 
MTREBIT and TANGIBLE indicating that a higher proportion of tangible assets and 
consequently higher depreciation values reduce the tax bill (no debt tax shields). Also as firm 
age and increase in size (AGE and SIZE), they are less profitable and therefore have a lower 
marginal tax rate. 
 
 
  234. Results 
4.1 Testing for a tax effect on leverage 
In section 2 the basic test equation for the target adjustment model is presented as: 
Di t = γ α + γ βTAX TAX + γ βZ Zit + (1 – γ) Di t – 1 + ei t (3) 
Z contains the variables discussed above and a set of industry dummy variables. This equation 
is estimated using a pooled sample across firms and time periods from 1990 to 2000. The 
main estimation problem is the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the 
equation. If there is auto-correlation in the residuals, then the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term leading to biased and inconsistent estimation. A simple 
application of the Hausmann test confirms this. In order to avoid this problem an instrumental 
variables (IV) estimator is utilized. The dependent variable lagged for two periods is used as 
an instrument for the lagged dependent variable. Unfortunately, with this procedure 998 firm-
year observations are lost
12. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table 8 here] 
 
  Table 8 (Panels A and B) presents the results from the pooled time series cross-
sectional IV regressions for the three different mesures of debt levels. The measures short-
term and long-term debt have problems given that some firms may roll over short-term debt 
and use it for long-term financing due to lower rates or more flexibility. Also some short-term 
bank debt is technically short-term debt, but gets renewed each year and is therefore for 
practical purposes long-term debt. This suggests using the sum of short- and long-term debt as 
a measure, but parts of short-term debt have nothing to do with capital structure decisions 
since the amount is determined by working capital requirements. Thus neither the sum of 
                                                 
12 We also removed the most extreme 0.5% values in either tail of the distribution. This procedure reduced the 
sample to 6730 observations and 898 firms. However the main results did not change so they are not reported. 
  24long- and short-term debt nor each of them stated separately will provide a good measure of 
the amount of debt. The alternative measure TOTALLOANS can avoid these problems, being 
calculated as long-term bank loans plus short-term bank loans plus creditors minus debtors 
plus other current liabilities over the book value of assets. This is an attempt to remove the 
impact of working capital requirements from short-term debt. The results for this measure are 
also presented in Table 8. In terms of explanatory power the R-squared for both short- and 
long-term bank debt regressions is around 57% whereas for TOTALLOANS the R-squared is 
around 75% thus providing a significantly better fit. 
 
The model is estimated once for each tax variable, including the control variables, and 
this generates a total of three regressions for each of the three different measures of debt. The 
nine regressions are reported in Table 8, as are the target adjustment coefficient and the 
adjusted R-squared. The control variables used in each regression are: INTANGIBLE, 
TANGIBLE,  PROFITABILITY,  SIZE,  BUSINESS  RISK,  GROWTH, Z-SCORE,  INTEREST, 
AGE and ROA. The control variables DIFFINTEREST, INFLATION and UNEMPLOYMENT 




For the total leverage, TOTALLOANS (Table 8, Panel A), all the tax variables are 
strongly significant; thus there is evidence of a strong tax effect in the sample with a stronger 
effect for short-term debt than for long-term debt (Table 8, Panel B). On average a 10% 
increase in MTREBIT will result in a 6.74% increase in the firm’s average debt level. Part of 
the explanation for this may be that it is easier to adjust the amount of short-term debt; if 
earnings are high, then the firm increases the amount of short-term debt to take advantage of 
                                                 
13 The regressions were also run with INFLATION,  DIFFINTEREST  and UNEMPLOYMENT instead of 
INTEREST. The results do not differ from the ones with the variable INTEREST included and are therefore not 
reported here. These variables are, however, included in the robustness test at the end of the paper. 
  25the tax shield and if earnings are low, then they reduce the amount of short-term debt since 
the tax shield has little value.  
 
For long-term bank loans (Table 8, Panel B) KINK and STAND are significant with 
the predicted signs whereas MTREBIT is not significant. On average the target adjustment 
coefficient is 20% and the adjusted R-squared is around 57%
14. As discussed in the Appendix, 
the estimates of MTREBIT may be biased upwards since the estimates of future earnings 
used to construct MTREBIT may be too high. The high earnings estimates increase the 
estimates of the marginal tax rate and the statutory tax rate is assigned as the marginal tax for 
“too many firms”. Under “normal circumstances”, if an explanatory variable is scaled 
upwards in a regression, for example changing the measurement from cents to dollars, then 
the estimate of the parameter will be reduced without affecting the significance of the 
parameter. However, in this case we may have too high earnings estimates which mean that 
too many firms are assigned the statutory tax rate as the marginal tax but the statutory tax rate 
is constant across firms. This reduces the variation in this variable and influences both the 
parameter estimate as well as reducing the significance level of the variable. As discussed in 
the Appendix it is not possible to ascertain if the procedure produces biased estimates of 
earnings or whether the high earnings is due to statistical chance. However, we do know that 
if it is biased then it will be towards making MTREBIT insignificant. 
 
  The results for short-term bank loans differ from the long-term bank loan case. The 
main difference is with MTREBIT which is now statistically significant at the 1% level and 
has the predicted sign. If scaled by one minus the target adjustment coefficient all else being 
equal, the results indicate that an increase of 10% in MTREBIT will result in a 3.71% increase 
                                                 
14 Without the lagged dependent variable the adjusted R-squared drops to around 11%, which is in line with 
results from analogous studies based on panel data and/or first difference specifications e.g. Graham ([1996a],  
[1998]) and Alworth and Arachi [2001]. 
  26in the firm’s short-term bank loans ratio. Therefore it appears that an increase in the marginal 
tax rate will induce firms to increase short-term bank loans to use the tax benefits of debt. 
Compared to the long-term bank debt, the coefficients on the tax variables are larger, which 
indicates that tax considerations are more important for short-term debt than for long-term 
debt. The potential importance of short-term debt in capital structure has been highlighted by 
Scholes and Wolfson [1988]. They argue (p. 170) that firms facing uncertainly in their tax 
status might prefer to use short-term debt when their tax rate is high. In this setting, short-term 
debt will be the least costly and easiest way to adjust debt levels temporarily to a firm’s 
optimum, and the potential cost of retiring outstanding debt in the future is avoided. Therefore 
a correct measure of debt to capture the tax effects in capital structure should include short-
term debt as part of its calculation.  
 
Bankruptcy measures 
  The primary measures of bankruptcy effects are TANGIBLE, SIZE, BUSINESS RISK 
ZSCORE and ROA. Except for SIZE these variables are all significant for long-term bank 
debt with the predicted signs. However, for short-term debt only TANGIBLE and ROA are 
significant. Thus it appears that bankruptcy considerations are not as important for short-term 
debt as for long-term debt. For TOTALLOANS (Table 8, Panel A) all the variables, except 
for SIZE and BUSINESS RISK, are significant but SIZE has the “wrong sign” since it is 
negative. The evidence points toward bankruptcy and the availability of collateral as 
important factors in the determination of capital structure for non-listed firms. This is 
consistent with Frank and Goyal [2004] who demonstrates that collateral availability is one of 
the most reliable factors in capital structure decisions for US firms. Thus firms that have more 
collateral tend to have more leverage. 
 
  27Agency/asymmetric information variables 
The agency variables are INTANGIBLE, PROFITABILITY, GROWTH and AGE. If 
the variable PROFITABILITY has a negative sign, it follows the asymmetric information 
(pecking order) theory which states that more profitable firms can finance more of their 
expenditures from internally generated funds. PROFITABLE is positive for long-term loans 
and negative for short-term loans. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
For TOTALLOANS the parameter is positive and significant, rejecting the pecking order 
theory. In Rajan and Zingales [1995] the pecking order theory is supported by a negative 
significant coefficient for USA, Japan and Canada but it is insignificant for the other 
countries. The rejection of the pecking order theory in this paper is surprising since the 
general intuition is that smaller firms (and high-growth firms) operating in a less-developed 
financial system are more likely to suffer from adverse selection problems than larger listed 
firms. The firms in this sample are solely financed by bank loans and trade credits whereas 
the large listed firms used in Rajan and Zingales [1995] raise part of their funding in financial 
markets. The main difference between bank financing and market financing is that banks 
monitor the firms continuously, thus reducing the adverse selection problem, but charge a 
higher interest rate than financial markets. Firms can therefore obtain additional financing 
from banks much easier than if they have to approach the market where the lenders will first 
want to perform a credit evaluation (charging a fixed cost but lower interest rates). Thus the 
Pecking Order theory is more likely to be found in market-financed firms than in bank-
financed firms. Since large firms are often market-financed and smaller firms bank-financed, 
these results are consistent with Frank and Goyal [2003] who find that for US firms the 
pecking order theory is more likely to be valid for large firms than for smaller firms. The 
evidence in Rajan and Zingales [1995] is mixed; US and Canada are both market-oriented 
countries and have a negative, significant coefficient on PROFITABILITY and Germany is 
  28bank-based and has a positive, although insignificant, coefficient on profitability. Japan, 
which in general is considered a bank-based country, has a negative significant coefficient. 
However, PROFITABILITY may be a noisy proxy for testing the pecking order theory and an 
alternative method is to use the methodology developed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999], 
a task left for future research. 
 
  The finding that PROFITABILITY is positive is consistent with the view that these 
firms have a lower bankruptcy probability and therefore have a higher debt capacity. It is also 
consistent with the view that debt is used as a bonding mechanism to restrain management 
from generating large amounts of (free) cash-flows as suggested by Jensen [1986]. However, 
this sample deals with firms where managers and owners are often the same persons reducing 
the need for a mechanism to restrain the activities of managers.  
 
  GROWTH is positive and significant for all three debt definitions, which rejects the 
underinvestment theory by Myers [1977]. Finally INTANGIBLE is only significant for short-
term loans with a negative sign and AGE is not significant at all.  
 
  Thus the agency-based measures from the balance sheet are not significant 
determinants of the capital structure of smaller non-listed firms. But this is not the same as 
saying that they are not important ex-ante, only that we do not observe the implications of 
these factors ex-post on the balance sheet. Before the loan is issued, these smaller non-listed 
firms are more prone to agency and asymmetric information problems compared to the large 
listed firms in the G7 countries. If the solution to these problems were the same for non-listed 
and listed firms, then we would observe the same implications on the balance sheet, but the 
argument put forward here is that banks solve these problems differently to financial markets. 
  29The solution used by financial markets for large listed firms is based on restricting the amount 
of debt and debt covenants, i.e. these solutions will appear on the balance sheet primarily in 
the form of a correlation between measures of agency problems and the amount of debt. 
Financial institutions, on the other hand, solve these problems primarily off the balance sheet 
by continuous monitoring and the threat of renegotiation/withdrawal of the debt contract if 
problems arise. Thus the lack of significance of the “agency variables” does not imply that 
agency and asymmetric information problems are not important but merely that it may not be 




4.2 Robustness of tax results 
  By definition we know that debt ratios are censored below zero and above one. We 
have therefore re-estimated the model using a Tobit regression with double censoring. The 
results are similar to those reported in Table 8 and are therefore not reported separately. Also 
the analysis has been repeated for firms with strictly positive debt, again without qualitative 
differences, and several tests for parameter stability over time have been undertaken. 
 
  As a final robustness check we apply the so-called “global sensitivity analysis” 
advocated by Leamer [1985]. The analysis undertaken above has several problems: (1) it 
involves running a large number of regressions and there is always the risk that the results 
reported are outliers chosen because of the significance of the focus variable (here the tax 
variables). (2) The results may be driven by outliers where the significance of the tax 
variables is driven by one industry or a few firms and therefore the results are not generally 
applicable. (3) The proxies for the tax variables may capture other effects that are not related 
  30to the tax effect. To analyze whether these problems have an influence on the results reported 
in the paper, we estimated the model for each tax variable dropping one of the control 
variables at a time, making a loop of 10 regressions as well as adding control variables not 
included in Table 8 but used in earlier regressions. For each of these loops first one industry at 
a time was dropped, then one firm at a time and in the end all the observations from one year 
were dropped. Finally the whole procedure was repeated without industry dummies leading to 
slightly more than 14000 regressions. The resulting parameter estimates and t-statistics are 
presented in Figure 3 for the MTREBIT variable. The results for the other tax variables are 
similar to the results for the MTREBIT variable.  
[PLEASE insert Figure 3 here] 
As seen from Figure 3, the results reported in Table 8 are close to the mean taken over the 
14000 regressions. Thus the result reported is not dependent on a specific specification of the 




The purpose of this paper was twofold: first to test for an impact of the debt tax shield 
on the capital structure choice of small non-listed firms and second to test whether the factors 
determining the capital structure of large listed firms are also relevant for small non-listed 
firms. The existing literature has primarily focused on testing various determinants of capital 
structure using listed firms that are large in their respective countries. The sources of capital 
differ between these two types of firms. Large listed firms have access to domestic as well as 
international financial markets whereas small non-listed firms are primarily financed using 
owner provided equity and debt financing from financial institutions. Finally asymmetric 
information and agency problems also differ between these two types of firms. Considering 
  31these differences, the question therefore remains whether the same factors are responsible for 
the capital structure choice in these two types of firms. First, we found that there is a 
significant debt tax shield impact on the capital structure choice for small non-listed firms. 
Second, we found that the traditional variables used to model agency problems were generally 
not significant for small non-listed firms except for the variables used to model bankruptcy 
risk (collateral). We attributed this result to the fact that banks have an ex-post credible threat 
of withdrawing funds and increasing interest rates in cases where firms exploit moral 
hazard/agency problems whereas financial markets restrict the amount of debt and increase 
interest rates ex-ante to control for agency/moral hazard problems. Thus in studies of capital 
structure one is more likely to find significant effects of proxies for agency problems that are 
based on balance sheet variables for large firms than for small non-listed firms. This, of 
course, does not mean that agency problems and asymmetric information do not course 
problems for small non-listed firm, only that the solution to these problems differs between 
these two types of firms.  Considering that one of the primary functions of banks is to solve 
asymmetric information and agency problems, another interpretation of the results in this 
paper is that Portuguese banks are indeed able to do this. 
  32Appendix 
Estimation of the marginal tax rate 
 
In order to avoid spurious correlations the marginal tax rate is calculated prior to the capital 
structure decision. Consider the case of two firms with identical earnings distributions: one 
with debt and one without debt in the capital structure. If the firm with debt faces losses and 
the firm without debt has positive earnings, then the marginal tax is lower for the firm with 
debt due to carry-forward, whereas for the firm without debt the marginal tax rate is higher, 
thus producing a negative correlation between the ex-post marginal tax rates and debt. To 
minimize this problem, income after depreciations, but before interest, is used for calculating 
the marginal tax rates before the financing decision is taken. 
 
  Two different methodologies are used to estimate expected future income. The first 
method follows Shevlin [1990], used by Graham ([1998], [2000]), and is based on the 
assumption that pre-tax income follows a random walk with drift: 
∆Iit = µi + εit     (4) 
where ∆Iit is the first difference in pre-tax income of firm i in year t, µi is the drift estimated as 
the sample mean of ∆Iit and εit is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and 
variance equal to that of ∆Iit over the sample years
15. 
 
In the second method used for forecasting taxable income each firm’s expected future 
income is given by its earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and is estimated in the 
following way: first the sample is divided into six industry sectors (defined previously). For 
                                                 
15 For more details see Graham [2000]. 
  33the n3 firms with four years of consecutive data in sector “i” the following model is estimate 
for each year “t”; 
i,j,t i,j,t-1 i,j,t-2 i,j,t-3
i i,1 ,2 ,3 i,j,t 3
i,j,t i,j,t i,j,t i,j,t
EBIT EBIT EBIT EBIT
α    +  ε 1,
SALES SALES SALES SALES
ii for j n ββ β =+ + + =     (4a). 
However, not all firms have four years of consecutive data available and in order to include 
these firms in the sample the following models are also estimated: 
i,j,t i,j,t-1 i,j,t-2
ii , 1 , 2 i , j , t
i,j,t i,j,t i,j,t
EBIT EBIT EBIT
α      ε 1,
SALES SALES SALES
i 2 for j n ββ =+ + + =     (4b) 
i,j,t i,j,t-1
i i,1 i,j,t 1
i,j,t i,j,t
EBIT EBIT
α    ε 1,
SALES SALES
for j n β =+ + =    (4c)
16. 
The next step is to simulate at set of earnings forecasts for the next five or six years for each 
company. If the firm has four years of consecutive data available, then model 4a is used and if 
it has three years of data, then model 4b is used and so forth. The forecast for t+1 is generated 
by: 
        i,j,t+1 i,j,t i,j,t-1 i,j,t-2
i,t i,t,1 , ,2 , ,3 i,t 3
i,j,t i,j,t i,j,t i,j,t
EBIT EBIT EBIT EBIT
α    + 
SALES SALES SALES SALES
it it ef o r jn ββ β =+ + + = 1 ,  
where e is a random draw with mean 0 and using the variance of the error term for the 
individual firms from the estimation of equations 4a-4c. The forecast for “t+1” is then used to 
generate a forecast for year “t+2” and so forth. 
 
  In order to test the efficiency of the above forecast procedure vis-à-vis the one used by 












αβ ε =+ + =  (5) 
                                                 
16 Notice that n1 > n2 > n3. Thus the firms with four years of consecutive data are also used to estimate the model 
(4b) and 4(c).  
  34where Realj,t,f/Salesit is the known EBIT at time t+f divided by sales for firm j, Forecasti,f t is 
earnings forecast “f” years ahead made at time “t”. All variables are scaled by total sales at 
time “t”. An unbiased forecast requires β1 to be one and the constant term zero. To undertake 
this test, a sample of firms with EBIT available for at least nine consecutive years is selected: 
four years to estimate the coefficients and five years of forecasts in the future to compare the 
estimated results with those that the firm actually obtained. 
 
[PLEASE insert Table A1 here] 
 
As seen from Table A1 neither approach provides good forecasts since β is below one 
in general, but the constant term is not significant. The forecasts are therefore too large 
compared to the actual numbers over the period. Notice that the periods are overlapping and 
that the results should therefore be interpreted with care, i.e. they do not constitute a statistical 
test of the forecast ability of the models. In particular it is not clear whether these results 
indicate a systematic bias or are just specific to the present period. However, the method used 
in this paper performs slightly better than the method used by Graham ([1998], [2000]). For 
one-, two-, three- and four-year forecasts the method in this paper outperforms Graham’s 
method since β is closer to one whereas it performs slightly worse for the five-year forecasts. 
 
  Under Portuguese tax rules with no tax loss carry-backs a firm with positive income 
has a marginal tax rate equal to the statutory tax rate. For a firm with negative income the 
marginal tax rate is below the statutory rate due to the availability of tax loss carry-forwards. 
If the firm has negative taxable income, then an additional unit of income reduces the losses 
that can be carried forward and used to offset taxable income in future years, thus increasing 
future taxes. If the losses carried forward fully offset positive income the next year, year 1, 
  35then an additional unit of income at year 0 is fully taxed in year 2 (provided that tax losses 
carried forward do not fully offset the positive income in year 2). Thus the marginal tax rate 
in year 0 of an additional unit of income is the statutory tax rate discounted for two periods 
and therefore smaller than the statutory tax rate at time 0. If the firm is not able to generate 
positive income in the subsequent five or six years to offset the losses carried forward, then it 
is assumed that the marginal tax rate is zero
17. Briefly, the marginal tax rate for a given firm 
in a given year is estimated by first estimating the expected income by simulation of equation 
(4a-c) for the next five or six years. For each simulation, taxes and tax loss carry-forwards are 
calculated for each year. Next, the net present value of the expected taxes over the next five or 
six years is calculated. Then one unit of income is added to the reference year and the present 
value of the tax bill is recalculated (always taking into account the loss carry-forward 
provisions). Taking the difference between these two present values and calculating the 
average over the simulations provide an estimate of the marginal tax rate. 
                                                 
17 Before 1996 the tax loss carry-forward provision was five years and six years after 1996. During the period 
covered by the sample the statutory tax rate changed twice from 36 to 34% (1997) and from 34 to 32% (2000). 
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  39Table 1: The Structure of Panel Data 
The panel data set is unbalanced as there are more observations for some firms than for others. 
The table shows the number of observations by year and industry type. The industry type classes are: Class 1: 
food and drinks; Class 2: textiles and clothes; Class 3: wood and paper paste; Class 4: chemical products; Class 
5: heavy industry and Class 6: machinery production and equipment. 
 
 
Number of Observations by Year and Industry Type 
Years OBSERVATIONS 
  Industry 1 Industry 2  Industry 3  Industry 4 Industry 5  Industry 6  TOTAL
1990 83  168  44  97  35  96  523 
1991 94  216  51  105  40  111 617 
1992 104  243  58  115  44  121  685 
1993 111  276  65  125  49  135  761 
1994 111  281  65  125  55  141  778 
1995 113  284  71  132  55  137  792 
1996 113  275  72  134  56  138  788 
1997 116  282  67  132  63  133  793 
1998 112  262  64  124  59  128  749 
1999 99  235  61  114  57  116 682 
2000 83  199  51  102  56  106 597 
TOTAL  1139 2721  669  1305  569  1362  7765 
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Table 2: Balance Sheets 
Average Balance Sheets Item as a Fraction of Total Assets 
 
  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Number of Observations  523 685 778 788 749 597 
Assets        
Fixed  Assets  0.52 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.47 
Intangible Assets     0.01     0.01     0.04     0.04     0.03     0.02 
Tangible Assets     0.43     0.42     0.40     0.37     0.39     0.34 
Investments     0.08     0.10      0.10     0.09     0.09     0.11 
Current Assets  0,48  0.47 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.52 
Stocks (Liquidity)     0.02     0.01     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.01 
Debtors     0.24     0.24     0.26     0.29     0.26     0.30 
Inventories     0.19     0.17     0.15     0.14     0.15     0.16 
Cash and Cash Equivalents     0.02     0.03     0.03     0.04     0.06     0.04 
Prepaid Expenses     0.01     0.02     0.01     0.01     0.01     0.01 
        
  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Number of Observations  523 685 778 788 749 597 
Shareholders’s Funds and 
Liabilities 
      
Shareholders’s Funds  0.49 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.46 
Capital     0.22     0.21     0.25     0.25     0.24     0.20 
Reserves     0.23     0.25     0.19     0.21     0.22     0.21 
Net Income of the Year     0.04     0.01     0.02     0.02     0.03     0.05 
Provisions  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Liabilities  0.49 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.53 
Non-Current Liabilities      0.16     0.15     0.14     0.15     0.13     0.13 
Long-Term Debt         0.13        0.12         0.09        0.11        0.09        0.10 
Bank Loans            0.10           0.10           0.07           0.09           0.08           0.09 
Other            0.03           0.02           0.02           0.02           0.01           0.01 
Other Non-Current Liabilities         0.03        0.03        0.05        0.04        0.04        0.03 
Current Liabilities      0.33     0.37     0.39       0.36     0.37     0.40 
Loans         0.10        0.13        0.12        0.08       0.08        0.09 
Bank Loans            0.10           0.13           0.12           0.08          0.08           0.09 
Others          <0.01         <0.01        <0.01        <0.01       <0.01           0.00 
Creditors         0.10        0.10       0.12       0.12      0.12        0.14 
Other Current Liabilities 
(Incl. Shareholder’s) 
       0.09        0.09       0.09       0.09      0.10        0.10 
Accrued Expenses         0.04        0.05       0.06       0.07      0.07        0.07 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Firm-Year Observations 
with Debt in their Capital Structure 
  Long Term  Short Term  Short and/or 
Long Term 
BANK LOANS (Whole Sample, 7765 obs)  54.26 76.32  81.88 
BANK LOANS (Small Firms Sample, 1308 obs)  48.85 72.78  80.20 
BANK LOANS (Large Firms Sample, 1721 obs)  57.47 79.78  82.50 
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a x  
B e
n e f i
t
Kink = 1 Kink < 1 Kink > 1
Amount of interest required to make EBT=0 
Actual Interest Expense =
Amount of interest required to make EBT=0 
Actual Interest Expense >
Amount of interest required to make EBT=0 






Table 4: Tax Variables and Debt Levels 
Tax Variables   Expected Relationship 
with Debt Levels 
Authors 
  MARGINAL TAX RATE  POSITIVE  Graham et al.[1998], Alworth and Arachi 
[2001] 
  KINK NEGATIVE  Graham  [2000] 
  STANDARDIZED KINK  POSITIVE  Graham [2000] 
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Table 5: Agency, Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy Variables and Debt Levels 
 






INTANGIBLE  -  -  -  Titman and Wessels [1988], 
Giannetti [2003] 
        
TANGIBLE  ?  +  +  Titman and Wessels [1988], Rajan 
and Zingales [1995] 
Shum [1996], Graham ([1996a], 
[1998]), Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
[1999], Gordon and Lee [2001], 
Booth et al. [2001], Giannetti 
[2003] 
        
PROFITABILITY  +  +  -  Titman and Wessels [1988], Rajan 
and Zingales [1995], Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers [1999], Bevan and 
Danbolt [2002] 
ROA +  +  -  Giannetti  [2003] 
        
SIZE  +  +  +  Titman and Wessels [1988], Rajan 
and Zingales [1995], Graham 
([1996a],[1998]), Alworth and 
Arachi [2001], Booth et al. [2001], 
Bevan and Danbolt [2002], 
Giannetti [2003] 
        
BUSINESS RISK  -      Bradley  et al. [1984], Titman and 
Wessels [1988], Bartholdy [1989], 
Shum [1996], Booth et al. [2001], 
Giannetti [2003] 
        
GROWTH  +  -  -  Titman and Wessels [1988], 
Bartholdy [1989] 




-    Mackie-Mason  [1990], Graham 
([1996a],[1998]), Alworth and 
Arachi [2001] 
        
AGE    +  +  Diamond [1991], Giannetti [2003] 






        
INTEREST RATE 
SPREAD 
NEGATIVE (Short Term) 
POSITIVE (Long Term) 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics  
The sample consists of 7,765 observations for firms from the Bank of Portugal Statistical Department’s database 
with CAE codes between 15000 and 36000 over the period 1990 through 2000. Total Assets is the book value of 
total assets. LONGBANKLOANS is the book value of total long-term bank loans over book value of total assets. 
SHORTBANKLOANS is the book value of total short-term bank loans over book value of total assets. 
BANKLOANS is the book value of both total short- and long-term bank debt over total assets. TOTALLOANS is 
defined as long-term bank loans plus short-term bank loans plus creditors minus debtors plus other current 
liabilities over the book value of assets. MTREBIT is the before-financing marginal tax rates simulated based on 
income after depreciation but before interest expenses are deducted. KINK is defined as the ratio of the amount 
of total interests required to make the tax function slope downward and the actual interest expenses. STAND is 
calculated as total interest times kink divided by the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes. 
INTANGIBLE is the book value of intangible assets divided by total assets. TANGIBLE is the book value of 
tangible assets divided by total assets. PROFITABILITY is the earnings before interest and taxes divided by the 
total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BUSINESS RISK is the standard deviation of return on 
assets by firm. GROWTH is calculated as the percentage change in total assets. ZSCORE is a modified version of 
Altman’s (1968) Z-Score. INTEREST is the three-month risk-free interest rate. DIFFINTEREST is the difference 
between long-term and short-term interest rates. INFLATION is the annual inflation rate. UNEMPLOYMENT is 
the annual unemployment rate. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years from the date of 
incorporation of the firm. ROA (return on assets) is defined as earnings after taxes and interests over total assets.  
 
Panel A:  Debt Levels 
Variable Mean  Median  Std  Deviation  Min  Max 
LONGBANKLOANS  0.0704 0.0148 0.1009  0.0000  0.8160 
SHORTBANKLOANS 0.1023 0.0667 0.1121  0.0000  0.6891 
BANKLOANS  0.1727 0.1522 0.1515  0.0000  0.9305 
TOTALLOANS  0.1440 0.1420 0.2191  -0.8867  0.9459 
 
Panel B:  Tax Variables 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Std  Deviation  Min  Max 
MTREBIT  0.3383 0.3600 0.0618  0.0000  0.3600 
KINK  3.3290 1.7689 3.0636  0.0000  8.0000 
STAND  1.5550 0.9650 2.0154  0.0000  30.289 
 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Std  Deviation  Min  Max 
INTANGIBLE  0.0113 0.0017  0.0361  0.0000  0.6266 
TANGIBLE  0.3918 0.3826  0.1754  0.0023  0.9699 
PROFITABILITY  0.3490 0.2978  0.2658  -0.5224  4.6165 
SIZE  6.3052 6.2649  0.5529  4.5547  8.5109 
BUSINESS RISK  0.0436 0.0349  0.0375  0.0003  0.4890 
GROWTH  0.1081 0.0552  0.5639  -0.9911  2.2482 
ZSCORE  1.5826 1.4617  0.9751  -1.7582  1.2537 
INTEREST  0.0848 0.0726  0.0425  0.0304  0.1634 
DIFFINTEREST  -0.0029 -0.0070  0.0171  -0.0174  0.0374 
INFLATION  0.0540 0.0410  0.0348  0.0220  0.1340 
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.0622 0.0650  0.0143  0.0380  0.0830 
AGE  1.3439 1.3802  0.3614  0.0000  2.3856 
ROA  0.0197 0.0125  0.0738  -1.1367  1.3484 
Panel C:  Agency, Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy Variables   46
               
 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Tax, Agency, Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy Variables 
 
  MTREBIT KINK STAND INTANGIBLE TANGIBLE PROFITABILITY SIZE BUSINESS
RISK 
GROWTH ZSCORE INTEREST AGE ROA
MTREBIT  1.000                        
KINK  0.160                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
1.000
STAND  0.160 -0.137 1.000
INTANGIBLE  -0.063 -0.067 0.033 1.000
TANGIBLE  -0.130 -0.182 -0.034 -0.075 1.000
PROFITABILITY 0.146 0.299 0.032 -0.046 -0.084 1.000
SIZE  -0.037 0.126 -0.035 0.160 -0.114 -0.157 1.000
BUSINESS RISK  -0.234 0.075 -0.425 0.019 0.050 0.091 -0.032 1.000
GROWTH  0.075 0.064 0.062 0.045 -0.052 -0.039 0.081 -0.055 1.000
ZSCORE  0.207 0.477 -0.033 -0.118 -0.291 0.593 -0.154 0.084 -0.021 1.000
INTEREST  0.179 -0.173 0.023 -0.061 0.013 0.026 -0.124 0.035 0.029 -0.007 1.000
AGE  -0.055 -0.012 -0.011 -0.002 -0.054 -0.118 0.191 -0.037 -0.045 -0.119 -0.030 1.000
ROA  0.241 0.0653 0.066 -0.054 -0.182 0.381 0.121 0.020 0.116 0.608 -0.065 -0.028 1.000
  
Table 8: Instrumental Variables (IV) Regressions 
The sample consists of 7765 firm-year observations over the period 1990 through 2000. The following 
regression is estimated: Di t = γ α + γ βTAX TAX + γ βZ Zit + (1 – γ) Di t – 1 + ei t. Di t is the debt level of firm i in 
year t. α is the constant term. γ is the target adjustment coefficient. TAX refers to taxation proxies that account 
for the effect of corporate taxes on capital structure (previously defined). Zit is a vector of predetermined control 
variables used in past studies of capital structure, such as: collateral, profitability, size, business risk, growth, 
bankruptcy, nominal interest rate, interest rate spread, inflation rate, unemployment rate, age, return on assets. Di 
t – 1 is the debt level of firm i in year t – 1. eit is the error term. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance are used. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Superscript * indicates statistical significance at 
0.01(*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. Two-stage least square estimation procedure is used. Industry 
dummy variables were included in the regressions but the coefficients are not reported. 
 
Panel A 
Dependent Variable: TOTALLOANS 
 
  TOTALLOANS 
























































































      
Target Adjustment 
Coefficient 
0.153 0.176 0.161 
Adjusted R-Squared 
 
0.748 0.749 0.746 
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Panel B 
Dependent Variables: LONGBANKLOANS and SHORTBANKLOANS 
 
  LONGBANKLOANS SHORTBANKLOANS 















































































































































































            
Target Adjustment 
Coefficient 
0.191 0.207 0.198  0.170  0.200 0.185 
Adjusted R-Squared 
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Mean       0.59499 
Std Error       0.07822 
Observations 14224
T-statistics









Mean       2.03031 
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Table A1: Earnings Forecast vs. Real Earnings 












αβ ε =+ + =  (5) 
where Realj,t,f/Salesit is the known EBIT at time t+f, divided by sales for firm j and Forecasti,f, t is earnings 
forecast “f” years ahead made at time “t”. The sample consists of firms with nine years of consecutive data, four 
years for estimation and five years of forecasts.  Three periods are used: 1990-1998, 1991-1999 and 1992-2000. 
The sample consists on 1072 nine-year periods. Superscript * indicate statistical significance at 0.01(*), 0.05 
(**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels.  
 
 Forecast  method 
  Present paper  Graham [1998,2000] 
  α  β  Α  β 
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